Politics
The Clinton Strategy That We Almost Forgot: Confrontation
Mar 17, 2010
By Ashley Cruseturner
By Ashley Cruseturner
In the aftermath of a crushing defeat in Massachusetts, President Obama found himself in a dreadful political predicament and, more pointedly, at a defining crossroads. Surely, it was time to cut his losses on health care. To survive, pundits advised, Obama would need to follow the example of Bill Clinton and move to the center. Seemingly on the brink of total ruin, the President defiantly disregarded the calls for course correction and tenaciously embraced an audacious path. Obama elected to employ another Clinton strategy, albeit an apparently less-memorable one, the carefully choreographed confrontation.
The impending vote on health care reform is still a toss-up to be sure, but passage looks increasingly believable. The President, fully engaged and charging with all his energy toward completion, understands his presidency hangs in the balance. The Speaker, thoroughly committed ideologically and politically, using the full power of her office, vows to deliver on this seventy-year promise. Having come this far, merely a handful of votes away from final passage, Democratic Leadership appears intent on breaking through regardless of the means necessary to achieve this long-awaited end.
Yesterday, even talk radio morosely surrendered to the enervating realization that the White House and the Speaker had reclaimed the momentum. Unconvincingly, conservative talkers alternated between a bravely confident pose and the halfhearted consolation that this legislation, and the process necessary for victory, would surely spell doom for Democrats in Congress and the President.
The best political forecaster in the business, Charlie Cook, characterized the Democratic dilemma as a choice between three unappealing options: quitting, failing, and passing a bill that a majority of Americans do not support. As a result, win, lose, or draw, Cook forecasts a wave election coming this fall sufficiently potent to wash away the Democratic majority in the House.
Does this President find himself in a no-win situation? Not Necessarily. As suggested, President Obama may have already adopted a Clinton model, just not the one so many pundits touted over the last month.
Two things saved the Clinton presidency. First and foremost, Bill Clinton benefited from a timely resurgence in the national economy. Not as obvious, but nevertheless significant, the Clinton White House understood political theater. The Clinton team made excellent use of the wall-to-wall media attention surrounding modern presidents to disseminate and reinforce their expertly crafted and well-aimed political messages.
More specifically, in a moment of extreme misery, the Clinton White House picked an important fight and won: the dramatic budget showdown with Newt Gingrich and the newly elected Republican Congress that culminated in the government shutdown of 1995-1996.
Intoxicated with their momentous midterm triumph, the Congressional Republicans of 1995 understandably overestimated the strength of their own ascendancy. Likewise, relying too heavily on a self-serving caricature of the President as a craven draft dodger, they carelessly miscalculated the true measure of Bill Clinton, expecting the untested former governor of a backwater state to fold in the face of determined opposition. In the end, contrary to GOP expectations, Republicans were the ones who lost their nerve and suffered the embarrassing reversal. The moment marked a critical turning point. Securing an unanticipated victory of great consequence over his then-surging opponents, President Clinton emerged as a rejuvenated leader exuding an enhanced air of competence and vitality.
Are contemporary Republicans walking into the same trap?
The circumstances and popular unrest roiling this moment makes 2010 different from 1995. Notwithstanding, the drama of a stirring victory against long odds could overshadow the short-term consequences and potential public backlash of a convoluted bill, which, in truth, appears more overblown than transformational.
The vast majority of voters find questions of policy and process hard to grasp and easy to forget, but winning is a message easily reducible to the lowest common denominator.
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Ashley Cruseturner teaches American history at McLennan Community College in Waco, Texas.
